ABSTRACT. This paper discusses the relation between deontic logic and the study of conversational interactions. Special attention is given to the notion of remedial interchange as analysed by sociologists and linguistic pragmaticians. This notion is close to the one of contrary-to-duty (reparational) obligation, which deontic logicians have been studying in its own right. The present article also investigates the question of whether some of the aspects of conversational interactions can fruitfully be described by using formal tools originally developed in the study of iterated belief change. I here adapt the latter tools to deontic logic, and attempt an account of remedial interchange (and, more generally, contrary-to-duty reasoning) 
Introduction
The present article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the interface between argumentation theory and non-monotonic logics, a family of logics used to study reasoning about what is normally the case. In these formalisms, conclusions may be later withdrawn when additional information is obtained. Over the past decades, non-monotonic logicians have been increasingly interested in the field of argumentation. Current research programmes in this area tend to fall into three main groups: those focusing on specific argumentative schemes, those dealing with the interface between semantics and pragmatics, and those developing a general theory of how arguments interact. The motivations of the last two groups are much less obvious than those of the first. Some comments are thus in order. First, the interest in pragmatic issues comes from the realization that some essential elements of the communicational content of an utterance, such as presupposition and conversational implicature, prove to be defeasible and subject to exceptions. This was already noticed by Grice [GRI 75 ], who viewed defeasibility as a defining property of so-called conversational implicatures. This observation has motivated a number of attempts to describe pragmatic inference as a non-monotonic one. Among the most representative works that have been done in this direction, one might mention the attempt made by Mercer [MER 88, MER 90] to apply default logic to the theory of presupposition, the theory of quantitative implicatures as put forth by Gazdar [GAZ 79a, GAZ 79b], or the attempt made by Perrault [PER 90] , and Appelt and Konolige [APP 89 ] to import non-monotonic logic into speech-act theory.
Programmes whose ambition is to develop a general theory of how arguments interact mainly include systems for defeasible argumentation as developed by Pollock [POL 87], Prakken and Sartor [PRA 97a], Bench-Capon [BEN 03], and others. This third group of programmes can be viewed as an attempt to clarify and meet some of the criticisms made by Toulmin [TOU 58 ] against formal logic. The focus shifts here from pragmatic considerations to general questions of acceptability in the face of iterated defeat among arguments. The style of analysis that is usually adopted can be described as follows. Given a theory i.e. a set of sentences representing the basic facts of the situation and a set of default rules, the entire set of arguments based on this theory is first determined. Next, the defeat relations among these arguments is computed. On the basis of this pattern of defeat relations, it is then possible to isolate a particular subset of arguments that are to be counted as justified (or, if you prefer, ultimately undefeated). There is a notion with which we must be very careful. It is the notion of reinstatement, which says that an argument should be counted as acceptable even if it is defeated, as long as its defeaters are themselves defeated. It is via this principle that the procedure isolates the set of justified arguments. As observed by Horty [HOR 01 ], the notion of reinstatement seems to be problematic. Intuitive counter-examples can be given to this idea, thereby setting a serious question mark against this group of theories. A more detailed discussion of this issue and related ones can be found in Prakken [PRA 02 ].
In this article my chief concern is to try to evaluate the extent to which deontic logic can be relevant to the study of argumentation. Special attention is given to the study of conversational interaction. In the best tradition of Goffman [GOF 71 ], who thought of remedial interchange as forming the nucleus of social activity, some writers tend to adopt a model of analysis in which reparational obligation plays a critical role [OWE 83, BRO 87, KER 94]. They often claim to be primarily concerned with the attempt to extract the formal pattern of conversational (face-to-face) interactions. Such a claim may, at first, be rather puzzling. Since the study of Chisholm [CHI 63 ], it has been increasingly clear that, as far as logic is concerned, the notion of a remedial interchange is not an easy one to grasp. The work of those interested in conversational interaction usually goes on as if the intricacies of contrary-to-duty norms had never been heard of.
This article also raises the question of whether deontic logic can benefit from concepts developed in the study of iterated belief change. My emphasis here is not on new formal results, but rather on introducing a way of thinking about contrary-toduty contexts that is slightly different from more familiar ones. (For an overview, see [CAR 02].). The basic idea is to assume that, when they learn that an obligation has been transgressed, interactants minimally revise the ideality ordering (over possible worlds) to have the appropriate obligation deconditionalised (or detached). This process will be referred to as a commutation, because close examination reveals that, at the time of the violation, the set of 'second best' worlds commutes with the set of 'best' worlds. As will emerge in due course, this is very similar in structure to so-called natural revision, as developed by Boutilier [BOU 96 ] to give a semantic characterization of iterated belief change. All preference-based deontic logics known to me are static in the sense that there is no room left for updating the comparative goodness relation (in some way or other) so as to accomodate new information.
1 My contention here is that in the dynamics of conversational interaction there is room for such readjustments. This paper is an attempt to substantiate these hypotheses further by elaborating the points outlined above. Section 2 presents Goffman's analysis of the notion of remedial interchange, as well as the difficulty I will focus on, which will take the form of a dilemma. Section 3 discusses one way of getting out of this dilemma, by taking time into account. This detour via so-called temporal deontic logic will serve as a means of introducing the basic idea underlying the account in terms of commutation, which will be the focus of attention in section 4. It will appear, then, that this second account provides a more satisfactory analysis of the notion of remedial interchange.
Remedial interchange
I begin by discussing the notion of remedial interchange as described by the sociologist E. Goffman in Ch. 3 of Relations in public (see [GOF 71] ). My purpose in this paper is simply to try to connect two research traditions that have so far been developing on their own. No attempt will be made here to discuss the issue of whether Goffman's conception stands up to close scrutiny. On the other hand, presumably most deontic logicians will think that the notion of remedial interchange just provides one example of a contrary-to-duty (CTD) structure one illustration among many others. I cannot here discuss in detail the many examples considered in the literature on deontic logic.
Goffman defends the view that interactions of agents can usefully be described as governed by norms. The norms Goffman is most concerned with are those to do with "territories of the self" [GOF 71, chap. 2] and the violations he is particularly interested in are those to do with "encroachments" on another's territory [GOF 71, p. 44]. The metaphor of territory is borrowed from the literature on ethology. This notion includes the following areas:
-Personal space. -Use space: the territory immediately around or in front of an individual, his claim to which is in general respected because of instrumental needs. For instance, when I am close to a picture, others will make some effort to walk around my line of vision.
-The turn: the order in which someone receives an item with respect to someone else in the same situation. Examples abound: number-tickets; names on a receptionist's list.
-Possessional territory: any set of objects that can be identified with the self.
-Information preserve: the set of facts about himself to which an individual expects to control access while in the presence of others. These are traditionally treated under the heading of "privacy".
-Conversation preserve: the right of an individual to exert some control over who can summon him and when he can be summoned.
From the description of these types of territories, it emerges that the notion of territory is a normative one, in the sense that in general its occupier has the right to claim it as their own and the right to attempt to exclude others from it. When an individual encroaches on another's territory, a particular kind of activity occurs: remedial interchange. Its function is a negative one: it is a means of avoiding conflict, by "transforming what could be seen as offensive into what can be seen as acceptable". [GOF 71, p. 109] Goffman sees remedial interchange as having three basic forms: accounts, apologies and requests. It is here unnecessary to examine these three kinds of communicative acts (and, more generally, the notion of remedial interchange) in the light of speech acts theory, since in this paper I aim simply to point out the relevance of deontic logic for those working on face-to-face interactions in the tradition of Goffman. (The list is necessarily selective.) They address the issue of language use and verbal interaction from the viewpoint of sociolinguistics and linguistic pragmatics. Their approach is inspired from the work of Goffman, in that apparently they all assume that remedial work has some role to play in any attempt to characterise interaction between agents. Such an approach has been criticized, on the ground that it exaggerates the aggressive character of face-to-face interaction, be it verbal or non-verbal. This is not germane for my present purpose.
At this point, it is interesting to consult the literature on deontic logic. In general these authors describe themselves as aiming to clarify the "logic" of conversational (face-to-face) interactions. For instance, Owen writes: The following sentences all appear to be true:
Here ´ µ (resp. ) stands for the obligation of given (resp. the obligation of ). The propositional letters Ó and Ö ½ can be read as (respectively) "offence" and "remedy". The ¾-operator expresses necessity of type S5. The sentence ¾´Ö ½ Óµ (premiss c)) is read "Ö ½ presupposes Ó". 
As is well-known from the literature on the logic of norms, there is an undesirable interaction between these two rules. On the one hand, the obligation The problems raised by CTDs have many facets. In this article I choose to focus on one of them only, namely the problem caused by the interplay between the two rules FD and WC. One might refer to this as (to put it in Åqvist's terms) "the dilemma of Weakening the Consequent and Factual Detachment". 4 In section 4, I shall introduce and explore a way of getting out of this dilemma, by using tools originally developed in the context of the study of iterated belief change. The intuition that guides and motivates such an approach is better explained by analogy with earlier proposals based on temporal deontic logic. As we shall see in section 3, a number of contributors to the deontic literature suggested that the obligation to do Ö ½ and the obligation not to do Ö ½ both hold, but not at the same time point. In some ways, the ¿. In standard deontic logic a normal modal logic of type KD, a further complication arises from the fact that conditional norms can be represented in two ways, depending upon whether or not "" precedes " ". Here is an attempt to formalize the rules on which this four-move interchange is based. One might imagine that makes his request at the same time that he lifts the receiver. In this case, violates his primary obligation not to take another's property. This first obligation can be rendered as Ó For the purposes of the present discussion, it is not necessary to specify what kind of territorial offence the letter Ó describes. At the same time that he violates his obligation not to do Ó, tries to convert his offensive act into an acceptable one by providing a remedy of the "request" type. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that provides such a remedy in accordance with a contrary-to-duty norm having the form (Ö ½ stands for the remedy move):
´Ö ½ Óµ
In the subsequent moves of the exchange (relief, appreciation and minimization), there is a shift in concern from the issue that a norm was violated to a focus on the way the participants handle their management of infractions. A similar formal treatment might be devised for these subsequent moves. For instance it does not seem unreasonable to believe that answers "Sure, go ahead" in accordance with an according-to-duty (ATD) obligation having the form where Ö ¾ describes any kind of utterances that can be assimilated to a move of the type "relief". And so forth. Goffman [GOF 71, p. 141] suggests that one participant's making such-and-such move places the other under some obligation to make the next one. If this view is correct, then the use of a deontic operator to formalize the fully expanded sequence does make sense. Table 1 recapitulates the sentences that appear to be true before the interaction above has even occurred. 
Row (II) lists the obligations on which the first round, remedy´Ö ½ µ and relief´Ö ¾ µ, is based. Row (III) mentions those producing the second round, appreciation ( ) and minimization (Ñ). A CTD obligation is attached to a primary obligation, and three ATD obligations are in turn associated with the CTD obligation. For lack of a better term, I use the label "integrity constraints" to cover the sentences mentioned in column (¬). All these are of the form ¾´ µ. This is read " presupposes ". As already suggested, the import of these non-normative premisses is essentially to rule out some sequences of moves that seem to be unrealistic (notwithstanding the admitted fact that they are logically possible).
This completes the description of the fully expanded remedial cycle. In section 4 I will outline a possible analysis of this example, by using tools from iterated belief change theory. Since this account owes some inspiration to so-called temporal deontic approaches to the representation of CTD scenarios, it will be useful to look at them first. The next section is an attempt to discuss this kind of treatment.
Using correctly temporalized propositions
In the seventies and early eighties, various systems of temporal deontic logic were developed to give a consistent representation of CTD scenarios. In this section I will focus on the system DARB, first presented in Åqvist & Hoepelman [ÅQV 81] and further developed in Åqvist [ÅQV 91a]. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a detailed account of this system. Rather, I will pick out those aspects of DARB that are relevant for the comparison with the account to be introduced in section 4.
The object language of DARB contains, in addition to the deontic operators alluded to above, the unary operator¨, to be read as "it will be the case at the next instant that". DARB has the following axiom schemata and inference rule for¨:
If is a theorem then so is¨ (Nec) DARB also contains a modal operator of historical necessity ¾, to be read as "it is necessary on the basis of the past and the present that". ¾ is a modality of the S5 type, which also obeys the law:
¾ provided that is a propositional letter.
An immediate consequence of the latter proviso is that the substitution rule fails in general. The reason why propositional letters are treated in this way has to do with the intended meaning of the ¾ operator. This one ranges over the set of histories that are still open, given the past and the present (which are fixed).
As far as the representation of CTD scenarios is concerned, the core of Åqvist's proposal is to distinguish between what is obligatory before the transgression and what is obligatory at the time of the violation. To understand how the solution works, it is not necessary to consider the three further moves that, according to Goffman, usually follow the remedy. For clarity's sake, in this section I will thus concentrate on the treatment given to the pair (offense, remedy). The proposed analysis can easily be extended to the full sequence.
Assuming that Ó and Ö ½ are executed in parallel, on might obtain a reasonable description of the situation before the transgression via the following quartet of DARBformulae:
It is easy to see that in DARB (IIa) entails ¾´¨ Ó ¨ Ö ½ µ. The meaning of such a proviso is likely to be opaque at first reading, and I shall briefly explain in a moment how I understand it. For present purposes, it is sufficient to observe that the above restriction is clearly satisfied in the case of: To sum up, the basic idea that guides proposals based on temporal deontic logic such as DARB consists in post-dating the obligatoriness of the remedy. More specifically, it consists in assuming that the time-of-being-in-force of the reparational obligation coincides with the time-of-realization of the violation. At first sight this way of handling the paradox seems to be very natural. Interactants will not consider themselves as being unconditionnally obliged to make the remedy move unless the transgression has occurred. To say this amounts, more or less, to saying that the truth value of any sentence must be made relative to the available knowledge about what the future will be. Hence the idea of evaluating formulas on pairs Ñ , where Ñ is a moment and a history passing through Ñ. " is true at the pair Ñ " can be understood to mean the same as " is true at Ñ under the hypothesis that is (other things being equal) the future of Ñ". Now the special requirement placed on the Factual Detachment principle becomes clearer. The inference from ´ µ to fails when the time-of-realization (= Ñ ½ ) of the boolean minor lies in the future of the time (= Ñ ¼ ) at which the normative major ´ µ holds, because between Ñ ¼ and Ñ ½ some "new" fact not historically or logically fixed at Ñ ¼ may occur and give rise to an overriding unconditional obligation.
The question of whether temporal deontic logic provides a satisfactory analysis of CTD scenarios has been much discussed within the literature. Among the issues that such a proposal has raised, the following two deserve special mention.
First of all, it is easy to see that (IVa) entails¨ Ó, i.e., after Ó is done, the primary interdiction to do Ó is transformed into an obligation to do Ó. This might be verified as follows. As we saw previously, we have the law ¾ provided that is a propositional letter. On the other hand, we also have the law ¾ .
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Putting the two together, we get whenever is a propositional letter, so that in particular Ó Ó. By the logic of¨, we finally get that¨Ó ¨ Ó is DARB-provable. It is worth mentioning that a number of deontic logicians do not find this result unwelcome. For one might interpret it to mean "Ó, which is settled as true, is also vacuously obligatory". This is not to say that Ó should be reiterated, since¨ Ó is consistent with¨¨ Ó. Neither is it to say that (be it settled as true or not) Ó should not have been done. As observed by, e.g., Thomason [THO 81, p. 173], one must distinguish carefully between two uses of "ought", a use appropriate for deliberating and advising (deliberative "ought") and a use appropriate for passing judgement (judgemental "ought"). A framework such as DARB is intended to give an account of the first one only. For instance, the monadic "ought" is interpreted as follows. Some of the possible futures of at Ñ are marked as the most perfect ones; what holds in all of them are the obligations at Ñ. Those histories that branched off in the past have become inaccessible, and are thus not considered. The dyadic obligation operator is interpreted in much the same way. In determining whether is obligatory given , one look at whether holds throughout all the best futures where holds. In both cases, the modality is forward-looking, rather than backward-looking. , where the antecedent of the conditional obligations happens after the consequent. The former says that a certain man goes to the assistance of his neighbours, and the latter that he tells them he is coming.
The objective here is to obtain a description of the situation at the time point Ñ ¼ . For this to be done, it is necessary to amend in one way or another the quartet (Ia)-(IVa). As it seems, neither (Ia) nor (IVa) needs to be altered. As for (IIa), it is enough to leave out the first¨. Hence:
It is easy to show that (IIb) entails ¾´¨ Ó Ö ½ µ. So, from the first two premisses, the desired Ö ½ can still validly be inferred, by using Weakening the Consequent.
But it does not seem possible to reformulate the remaining premiss in such a way that some meaningful conclusion might be inferred from the couple (IIIb)-(IVb), by using the restricted form of Factual Detachment alluded to above. Consider the proviso this rule contains. It says that the time-of-realization of the violation must coincide with or be earlier than the time-of-being-in-force of the reparational obligation. Premiss (IVb) already says that the violation occurs at Ñ ½ . This means that the obligation must come into force at Ñ ½ , or perhaps later. Suppose it is Ñ ½ (the argument would be similar if the norm came into force at a later time). Then the correct rendering is ´ Óµ The account in terms of iterated revision to which I now turn is an attempt to solve this second problem. However, the proposed construction will face a difficulty that is very similar to the first one. One possible way of refining the construction will be proposed, and briefly discussed.
An analysis in terms of commutation
The basic idea is to assume that a fact (in particular, a transgression) might affect the ideality ordering in the semantics. A similar intuition guides several constructions used in the study of iterated belief revision [SPO 88, DAR 94, WIL 94, LEH 95, BOU 96, FER 02, NAY 03]. For reasons to be made clear later, it is the notion of natural revision [BOU 96 ] that will be used here. As we shall see, its principal feature is that, when contrary-to-duty information is taken into account, the set of "second best" worlds commutes with the set of "best" worlds. I have said that this approach in terms of commutation owes some inspiration to the so-called preference-based temporal deontic solution. At the end of the present inquiry, it will appear that the two accounts are clearly distinct. Various other strategies for giving a consistent representation to CTD scenarios have been proposed in the literature on deontic logic. It falls outside the scope of this article to review them. Note that, by switching to so-called iterated revision, I implicitly opt for a methodology that is very different from the one propounded by the authors of the AGM 1985 paradigm. The construction I will introduce in this section will cover the successive moves of the remedial cycle simultaneously. To put it another way, the construction will cover the "flat" or "first-degree" (non-iterated) case and the iterated case at once. This contrasts with the more analytical approach that is followed in AGM 1985. Here the exploration of the iterated case comes after the study of the flat case. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the merits or demerits of these two methods (for a more detailed discussion, see Makinson [MAK 03]). Noticeably, those sympathetic to the analytical method in general believe that, if one can deal with the simpler noniterated case in a principled way (as needs to be done anyway), then it should be possible to apply the same procedures to the more complex iterated one. This is not always an easy task. A construction meant for the non-iterated case might not be suitable for the iterated one. Consider the case of the theory of Carmo and Jones [CAR 95]. They defend the view that CTD scenarios can be represented consistently if a distinction is made between ideal and actual obligations. In Carmo and Jones [CAR 02], it is shown that serious difficulties arise as soon as further levels of CTDs are introduced. The latter introduction will be assimilated below with the fact that iteration comes into the picture. This section is organized as follows. The treatment presupposes some familiarity with the Hansson-Lewis semantics for deontic logic. First, in order to clear the ground, I recall the main ingredients of such a semantics (subsection 4.1). Second, I outline some of the ways the semantics could be refined if it is to deal with the analysis of a one-move interchange (subsection 4.2). Third, in order to complete the account, I consider the fully expanded remedial cycle (subsection 4.3). Fourth, I incorporate the construction into a branching-time logic, as an attempt to deal with the requestresponse more sensitively (subsection 4.4).
Background
Most of the definitions that I will use are fairly straightforward. The only new feature concerns the "dynamic" component that iterated revision theories aim to incorporate into preference-based semantics. However, to make the exposition clearer, I postpone discussion of this component until the next subsection. Ï ¢ Ï is a pre-order, i.e. it is a reflexive and transitive relation on Ï ; I take Û Û ¼ to mean that Û is at least as preferred as Û ¼ (or Û is at least as good as Û ¼ )
3) is a function which assigns to each propositional letter Ô in Prop a subset of Ï .
Let ℄ Å denote the truth-set of in Å, i.e. the set of worlds in Å at which is true. Let min Å´ µ denote the set of -minima in ℄ Å , i.e.
Intuitively min Å´ µ is understood to be the set of most perfect -worlds. For such a set not to be empty, two conditions must be fulfilled. One is that is satisfiable in Å, i.e. there is some world Û in Å at which is true. The other is that there are no infinite sequences of ever more perfect -worlds. The truth-conditions for the dyadic obligation operator are defined as follows:
According to (Def), model Å satisfies the obligation " should be the case if is the case", Å ´ µ, whenever in the most perfect worlds, where holds, holds too. 9 For the sake of simplicity, is taken to be equivalent to ´ µ where is a tautology.
One-move interchange
This subsection shows how to refine the Hansson-Lewis semantics so as to deal with the analysis of a one-move interchange.
The first step involves constructing a typical model, say Å ½ , of the initial premisses set as given in table 1. Given the subset (¬) of integrity constraints, the follow-. Throughout this paper I work with minimality under , as is the custom in non-monotonic logic. Deontic logicians usually work with maximality under the converse relation. This is more in line with the idea that, the more perfect a world is, the farther from actuality it is. From a mathematical point of view, the two idioms are equivalent.
ing universe Ï ½ is complete in the sense of giving an exhaustive characterisation of how the interaction might evolve:
In Û ½ the primary obligation is fulfilled. In Û ¾ this obligation is violated, but the other four obligations are fulfilled. In Û ¿ Û , the primary obligation is violated, and one of the other four obligations is also violated. One might adopt the hierarchical ordering as depicted in Figure 1 It is now possible to bring the territorial offence into the picture. The idea is to assume that introducing a violation has a specific impact on the ideality ordering associated with the premisses set. The hypothesis here is twofold: a) incorporating contrary-to-duty information, those taking part in the face-to-face interaction accommodate that ordering so as to have the appropriate unconditional obligation "detached"; b) in order to bring the remedial interchange to completion, they keep as much of the initial ordering as possible.
These assumptions can be expressed more rigorously as follows. 
Here I draw on the treatment by Boutilier [BOU 96] of iterated revision. His term for it is "natural revision".´È ½ µ aims to capture a). Roughly,´È ½ µ says that every minimal -world is shifted down to the bottom of the new ordering.´È ¾ µ aims to capture b). Literally,´È ¾ µ says that for Û ½ and Û ¾ not in min Å´ µ, then ¼ and are the same. This has the effect of leaving unaltered except as indispensably required by´È ½ µ.
Intuitively,´È ½ µ means that min Å´ µ forms the set of "newly" best worlds. Expressed formally, this gloss amounts to saying that min Å´ µ min Å ´Ï µ. We are almost ready, if we can prove that Û Û ¾ . And, to prove this inequality, we only need to show that neither Û nor Û ¾ is in min Å´ µ. As for Û, it suffices to invoké È ½ µ(a) and Û ¼ Û ¾ . As for Û ¾ , we argue as follows. Suppose Û ¾ ¾ min Å´ µ.
In the presence of´È ½ µ(a), this assumption (which we want to reduce ad absurdum)
This completes the proof. It remains to re-order the members of Ï Û ¾ . None is in min Å½´Ó µ. So, by´È ¾ µ, inside that set the ideality ordering must be left unaltered. This means that within the subset Û ¿ Û neither world is preferred over the other. This also
This completes the construction of the new ordering as described in figure 2. Å ½ Ó depicts the ordering at the time of the offence. Of special interest is the fact that Å ½ Ó is much like Å ½ , except that the best world (viz. Û ½ ) and the 2nd best one (viz. Û ¾ ) have permuted. For this reason, it is tempting to refer to this way of thinking about remedial interchange as the "commutation approach". It can easily be verified that, at this very moment of the face-to-face relation, we do not havē
as one would expect. This is reminiscent of the step where in section 3 the sentencë Ö ½ was inferred from (IIIa) and (IVa).
It is noteworthy that we no longer havē
Some may not be satisfied with this result. As noted earlier, something very similar happens in temporal deontic logic. As also observed, within this set-up the appearance of a paradox is considerably diminished: Ó is in fact settled as true; it is thus vacuously obligatory. The trouble with this line of defence is that it is difficult to interpret Å ½ Ó as stating what is obligatory after that Ó has been settled as true. Indeed, in Figure 2 above, Ó is not true at each point in the structure. This means that, if (like in Prakken and Sergot's theory [PRA 97b]) settledness is encoded using a S5 ¾-modality, then strictly speaking fact Ó cannot be deemed a fixed, necessary, unalterable feature of the situation. How can the present account be brought more in line with our intuitions regarding settledness? One way to achieve this has been explored by van der Torre and Tan [TOR 99]. Their semantics is based upon the update semantics that Veltman [VEL 96] has developed for default reasoning. The revision procedure they use (their term for it is "zoom in") does not shift every minimal -world to the bottom of the ordering, but deletes all worlds in which is false. 11 This seems to reflect a rather common intuition. The worlds at which the input is false are eliminated, because they are too remote from the actual world, or outside any agent's control. To put It is natural to ask whether problems of that kind do not indicate the need for an alternative approach. In particular, some might be tempted not to revise the preference relation at all, but rather to distinguish between two distinct relations a preference relation and an accessibility relation. The argument can be summarized as follows. As time passes the preference between possible worlds remain unchanged, but the accessibility of worlds differs. When Ó is followed by Ó, it is not necessary to eliminate all possible worlds in the successive diminutions of the accessibility relation. For even if one possible world is no longer accessible, another one very much like it in many respects (but with a different time stamp) may still be accessible. Although I need to subject this point to further investigations, I believe that this way of thinking takes us back to the DARB treatment. This might be seen through a careful examination of how the truth-clauses work, when applied to CTD examples. 
The full sequence analysed
Disregarding temporarily the aforementioned difficulty, I now apply the proposed construction to the fully expanded remedial sequence. The tables given below exhaust the moves that can in fact be made, and check whether the account gives the desired result for the matching obligations. For clarity's sake, I proceed step by step, starting with the first move in the sequence, up to the fourth one. I assume that interactants do not repeat identical moves. The first line recapitulates the analysis suggested in the previous section. This line says that, at the time of move Ó, then the best world Û ½ commutes with the 2nd best world Û ¾ , so that the obligation of Ö ½ comes into force. The second line expresses the proposition that, were move Ó not to be made, then the initial ordering Å ½ would be left untouched, and the obligation of Ö ½ would still hold. This is intuitively plausible. Table 3 below deals with a two-move interchange. The penultimate column shows how many times the worlds commute during the conversation. The first line considers the case where Ó is followed by Ö ½ , and the second one the case where Ó is followed by Ö ½ . In both cases, the most recent ordering (Å ½ Ó) differs from the initial one´Å ½ µ. In the first case, the most recent ordering, with Û ¾ ranked below Û ½ , is left untouched, and so is the obligation of Ö ¾ . In the second case, we have that Û ½ and Û ¾ commute again. This takes us back to Å ½ and, as a result, the obligation of Ö ¾ is reinstated.
½¾. This is Boutilier and

Two-move interchange
Line 3 considers the case where Ó is followed by Ö ½ , and line 4 the case where Ó is followed by Ö ½ . In both cases, the most recent ordering (viz. Å ½ Ó) is the same as the initial one´Å ½ µ. In the first case, we have that Û ½ and Û ¾ permute, so that the obligation of Ö ¾ comes into force. In the second case, the ordering is left untouched, and so is the obligation of Ö ¾ .
Table 3. Two-move interchange
Revision sequence Induced ordering Perm Output
One might summarize table 3 as follows. If move Ö ½ is made (line 1 and 3), then the obligation of Ö ¾ comes into force whatever happened before Ö ½ . Were move Ö ½ not to be made (line 2 and 4), then the obligation of Ö ¾ would still hold and this, whatever happened before Ö ½ . This is intuitively plausible. 1, 3, 5 and 7) , then the obligation of comes into force whatever happened before Ö ¾ . Were move Ö ¾ not to be made (lines 2, 4, 6 and 8), then the obligation of would be true whatever happened before Ö ¾ . Again, this is intuitively plausible. 
Three-move interchange
1.´´Å ½ Óµ Ö ½ µ Ö ¾ Û ¾ Û ½ Û (with ¿ µ 1 2.´´Å ½ Óµ Ö ½ µ Ö ¾ Û ½ Û ¾ Û 2 3.´´Å ½ Óµ Ö ½ µ Ö ¾ Û ¾ Û ½ Û 3 4.´´Å ½ Óµ Ö ½ µ Ö ¾ Û ½ Û ¾ Û 2 5.´´Å ½ Óµ Ö ½ µ Ö ¾ Û ¾ Û ½ Û (with ¿ µ 1 6.´´Å ½ Óµ Ö ½ µ Ö ¾ Û ½ Û ¾ Û 2 7.´´Å ½ Óµ Ö ½ µ Ö ¾ Û ¾ Û ½ Û 1 8.´´Å ½ Óµ Ö ½ µ Ö ¾ Û ½ Û ¾ Û 0 4.3.4
. Four-move interchange
As shown in table 5 below, the account deals with the fourth move in much the same way as with the first three. Roughly table 5 says that, once move has been made (lines marked with an odd number), then the obligation of Ñ holds, and that if move is not made (lines marked with an even number), then the obligation of Ñ is true. Once again, this is intuitively plausible.
This ends the verification. It might be interesting to explore ways in which the concept of commutation can be used to give a general framework for iterated revision. A closer look at the above tables reveals that, once the first move has been made, the best world and the second best one commute each time the "polarity" of the input sentence changes. The question naturally arises whether it is possible to develop a model of iterated revision based on this phenomenon. This is part of my current research.
The request-response within a tense logic
I now indicate how to incorporate the construction outlined in the previous subsections into a branching-time framework, so as to deal with the request-response more sensitively. I say "more sensitively", because there is something puzzling in the temporal interpretation (or gloss) given to the treatment in terms of commutation. If we assume that interactants cannot detach the unconditional obligation of providing a remedy (and, as a result, do what they believe to be the second best) unless the offence has been made, then it is unclear how the solution could work for those scenarios 
where the remedy precedes the offence in time (as is typically the case for remedies of the "request" type). This subsection is an attempt to clarify this point.
Let us assume that the object language contains, in addition to the dyadic deontic operator ´ µ, a monadic operator¨read as "it will be the case at the next moment that", and a modal operator of historical necessity ¾ to be read as "it is necessary on the basis of the past that". Let us define a deontic branching temporal frame as a structure Å ´´Ì Ö µ µ where:
1)´Ì Ö µ is a tree-like structure. Ì Ö is a non-empty set of times or moments Ñ ½ Ñ ¾ . is the temporal relation (time is assumed to be discrete). A history is defined as a maximal chain of moments. À denotes the set of all histories, and À Ñ the subset of those passing through moment Ñ.
2)
À ¢ À is a pre-order, i.e. it is a reflexive and transitive relation on Ï .
Intuitively,
¼ means that is at least as good as ¼ .
3) is a function that assigns to each propositional letter Ô the set of Ñ pairs at which intuitively Ô is thought of as true. Define:
It is now possible to analyse the case where the remedy precedes the offence. In the analysis I shall focus on the pair (offence, request) and ignore subsequent moves. The following triple of formulae (where Ö ½ denotes the request-response) gives a reasonable description of the situation when (so to say) the offence has not been anticipated yet: Now that the construction has been incorporated within a branching-time framework, it appears that the parallel initially drawn (for heuristic purposes) between temporal deontic approaches and the account in terms of commutation breaks down. It remains to give a better intuitive explanation to the latter. I shall explore this issue in future research.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, I outlined a preference-based account in terms of commutation, which brings the dynamics of obligations to the fore. I also illustrated how the proposed construction may serve as a tool for analysing one kind of linguistic exchange: the remedial interchange.
Of course, the account outlined in this paper can only be suggestive of how future work should proceed. First of all, we have seen that there is a problem with the flat (non-iterated) part of the framework: primary norms do not "survive" an update by a contrary-to-duty context. Can such an anomaly be avoided? Second, it would be interesting to know what the construction has to say about the many other CTD structures that are discussed in deontic literature [PRA 96, PRA 97b, MAK 01, CAR 02]. In particular, it is natural to ask what happens if a "second-level" of CTDs is introduced. Third, it might be thought that any account of interactive communication must be linked, in some way or other, to speech-act theory. These are only hints, to which a later essay will be devoted.
It is clear that, of these three issues, the first one should be our prime target. But a further complication arises from the fact that the commutation approach can also deliver the right conclusion. Hence, such an approach should not be excluded entirely, as it may contain elements necessary to the solution of some other benchmark problems discussed in deontic literature. For instance, example 6 below shows that, due precisely to the choosen revision policy, the account does not generate what has become known as the "pragmatic oddity". The intended point in so-called pragmatic oddity is that the Factual Detachment rule is problematic per se. This can be illustrated in examples of much the same vein as those considered so far. Consider: 
